











   
Abstract 
An experiment tested whether and in what circumstances people are more likely to believe an 
event simply because it makes them better off. Subjects observed a financial asset's historical 
price chart, and received both an accuracy bonus for predicting the price at some future point, 
and an unconditional award that was either increasing or decreasing in this price. Despite 
incentives  for  hedging,  subjects  gaining  from  high  prices  made  significantly  higher 
predictions than those gaining from low prices. The magnitude of the bias was smaller in 
charts with less subjective uncertainty, but was independent of the amount paid for accurate 
predictions. 
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 G. Mayraz, submitted 2011 1 Introduction
People exhibit wishful thinking if they are more likely to believe an event simply
because it makes them better o. The higher their utility if the event is true, the
higher their subjective probability that it is true.
Wishful thinking has strong implications for decision making whenever subjective
judgments of likelihood play an important role.1 In single person decision problems
agents may underestimate the risks they are exposed to, and overestimate the likeli-
hood and value of uncertain rewards. In strategic environments the beliefs of agents
with dierent interests may dier systematically in accordance with their interests.
In dynamic environments a change in the payo from an event may thereby alter
the subjective likelihood that the event obtains, resulting in a change in preferences.
For example, an investment in a nancial asset would cause the investor to become
more sanguine about the risks, leading her to escalate the investment well beyond
her original plan.
These are, of course, all if-then statements: if wishful thinking aects beliefs in
a given economic environment then it would have certain interesting implications for
the behavior of decision makers in that environment. But is wishful thinking a real
phenomenon? And supposing it is real, under what circumstances is it signicant
enough to aect decisions? What if the stakes are high?
The existing evidence for wishful thinking is mixed. On the one hand, wishful
thinking provides a unied account for a wide range of empirical ndings. On
the other hand, while wishful thinking is the most parsimonious account of the
evidence, each particular nding can also be given other explanations. Much of the
evidence can be explained by cognitive biases that have nothing to do with wishful
thinking (Miller and Ross, 1975; Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Other evidence can be
explained by an `ego-utility' bias, according to which people are more likely to believe
an event if it ts their self-image (K} oszegi, 2006; Stone, 2006). The ego-utility
account is related to wishful thinking, but is narrower in scope: whereas wishful
thinking implies bias in beliefs over any payo-relevant event, ego-utility implies
bias only if the event reects on the decision maker's self-image. Finally, some of
1As noted by Knight (1921) many decisions of interest to economists involve such judgments:
\Business decisions, for example, deal with situations which are far too unique, generally speaking,
for any sort of statistical tabulation to have any value for guidance. The conception of an objectively
measurable probability or chance is simply inapplicable." (III.VII.47);\Yet it is true, and the fact
can hardly be overemphasized, that a judgment of probability is actually made in such cases."
(III.VII.40).
2the ndings that are suggestive of wishful thinking can also be given a plausible
rational account (Van den Steen, 2004; Santos-Pinto and Sobel, 2005; Beno^ t and
Dubra, 2011).
The relevant empirical ndings appear under many dierent names, including
self-serving bias, cognitive dissonance, over-optimism, and over-condence. One
powerful example is a study of self-serving bias in pre-trial bargaining, in which
incentive compatible predictions for the amount the judge would award the plain-
ti were signicantly higher among subjects given the role of plainti than among
subjects given the role of defendant (Loewenstein et al., 1993; Babcock et al., 1995;
Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997), leading to an inecient failure to reach a pre-trial
settlement. Wishful thinking provides a natural explanation of the dierence in
beliefs between subjects in the two roles, since plaintis (defendants) are better-o
if the award is high (low). It is also possible, however, to explain the dierence in
beliefs as the outcome of a cognitive bias to do with memory or attention. When
preparing for the pre-trial bargaining phase of the experiment, subjects may have
focused their reading of the evidence on arguments favoring their own side. A biased
prediction of the judge's decision could then have resulted simply from basing the
prediction on the part of the evidence that they best remembered.
The confound with ego utility is best exemplied by cognitive dissonance studies,
such as the Knox and Inkster (1968) study of cognitive dissonance in horse betting.
The key nding was that placing a bet on a horse signicantly increases the con-
dence that the horse would win the race.2 Since the act of placing the bet ties
the bettor's utility to the horse's performance, the change in belief can be explained
as the outcome of wishful thinking on the part of bettors. However, the horse's
performance reects on the bettor's judgment, as well as on her payo more gener-
ally, and so the change in the beliefs of bettors is also consistent with an ego-utility
explanation.
These and other empirical studies establish the existence of biased beliefs, and
trace their consequences in economically important environments.3 These studies
do not, however, make it possible to empirically separate wishful thinking from
alternative explanations. The primary aim of the present paper is to oer a simple
test of wishful thinking that is free of these confounds.
2By analogy, the acquisition of a nancial asset would cause investors to become more positive
about the asset.
3See also Olsen (1997), Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), Mul-
lainathan and Washington (2009), Park and Santos-Pinto (2010), and Eil and Rao (2011).
3The test uses a simple lab experiment. Subjects in the experiment observed a
chart of historical wheat prices,4 and their one and only task was to predict what the
price would be at some future time point. There was random assignment into two
treatment groups: Farmers, whose payo was increasing in the future price of wheat,
and Bakers, whose payo was decreasing in this price. Subjects in both groups also
received a performance bonus as a function of the accuracy of their prediction.
Wishful thinking predicts bias whenever decision makers have a stake in what the
state of the world is. Farmers gain from high prices, and their beliefs should therefore
be biased upward as compared to what they would otherwise be. The opposite is true
for Bakers. Given the random allocation, there should be a systematic dierence in
beliefs between the two groups, with Farmers expecting higher prices than Bakers.
In a standard rational model, there should be only random dierences in beliefs
between the two groups. The ego-utility explanation predicts bias if and only if the
decision maker's self-image is involved. As this is not the case in the present experi-
ment, ego-utility predicts no bias. Any number of cognitive biases could potentially
aect beliefs in the experiment, and there is no good reason to expect predictions
to coincide with the truth. However, since Farmers and Bakers are given the same
information and the same prediction task, there is no plausible reason for cognitive
biases to result in a dierence in beliefs between the two groups. The presence or
absence of a dierence in beliefs between Farmers and Bakers therefore makes it
possible to empirically separate wishful thinking from ego-utility, cognitive bias, and
standard rational explanations.
The statistic used to identify a systematic dierence in beliefs between the two
groups was the dierence between the average predictions of Farmers and Bakers.
The prediction bonus formula was designed so that truthful reporting maximizes
subjective expected payo. As long as decision makers are risk-neutral over small
amounts of money, the dierence in predictions should provide an unbiased estimate
of the dierence in beliefs. Risk-averse subjects may, however, seek to intentionally
hedge their predictions, so as to smooth their payo across dierent states. Such
hedging would result in Farmers under-reporting their true prediction, and an op-
posite bias for Bakers. Consequently, the estimated dierence in beliefs between the
two treatment groups may be biased downward.
The null hypothesis was dened as a non-positive dierence in beliefs between
Farmers and Bakers. Hedging could plausibly have resulted in a failure to reject
4Charts were adapted from real asset price data, though not specically wheat prices.
4the null when the true dierence in beliefs is positive. There were no corresponding
reasons to expect a false positive result. The actual observation was a positive
and statistically measurable dierence in predictions between Farmers and Bakers
(p < 0:0002). This result is explained by wishful thinking, but by neither ego-utility
nor cognitive biases.
The implication of this result is that wishful thinking does indeed aect subjec-
tive judgments of likelihood. However, while much of the interest in wishful thinking
is in the possibility that it aects economically important decisions, the stakes in
the experiment were relatively trivial amounts of money. The result would thus be
considerably stronger if a similar experiment were run with much bigger prizes, but
this may be prohibitively expensive. The alternative pursued in this paper is to test
dierent theories of wishful thinking by varying the cost of getting beliefs wrong,
while keeping the overall amounts small. Dierent theories of wishful thinking dier
not only in the limit of high stake decisions, but also in their predictions for how the
magnitude of the bias depend on the incentives for accuracy. If some particular the-
ory survives this test, it can then be used with some condence to make predictions
for high stakes environments.
There are two principal approaches to modelling wishful thinking: strategic and
non strategic. Psychologists commonly see wishful thinking as the outcome of a
conict between a desire to have an accurate view of the world an a desire to reach a
`directional' conclusion (Kunda, 1990). Economists mostly follow a similar approach,
viewing wishful thinking as part of a strategy to balance the gain from positively
biased beliefs against the cost in poor decisions by future selves (Akerlof and Dickens,
1982; Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005).5 From the present perspective, the most
important implication of this family of models is that the magnitude of the bias
decreases with the cost of getting beliefs wrong. We should thus expect an increase
in the costs of biased beliefs to result in a measurably smaller bias, even if the stakes
remain small.
Instead of modelling wishful thinking as a strategic choice, it is also possible
to see it as the outcome of an imperfect belief formation process. Mayraz (2011)
oers a descriptive model of wishful thinking along these lines, in which subjective
beliefs are allowed to depend on the payo consequences of events as well as on
5These are the two most relevant papers, but there are many other models in which agents
choose an optimal level of bias in their beliefs, e.g. Carrillo and Mariotti (2000); Caplin and Leahy
(2001); Benabou and Tirole (2002); Yariv (2002); Compte and Postlewaite (2004); K} oszegi (2006).
5normatively relevant information. The key implication is that, controlling for the
amount of available information, the magnitude of the wishful thinking bias should
be independent of its eect on future decisions. In particular, a signicant bias
may well remain in high-stakes decisions, as long as the available information leaves
sucient room for uncertainty.
Dierentiating between these two modelling approaches requires the ability to
manipulate the incentives for holding accurate beliefs. The design of the experiment
aorded a simple way to do so, by varying the scale of the accuracy bonus: the larger
the potential bonus, the more subjects had to lose from holding biased beliefs. If
wishful thinking is strategic, the magnitude of the bias should decrease in the scale
of the accuracy bonus. If wishful thinking is non strategic, there should be no change
in the magnitude of the bias as the scale of the accuracy bonus is increased.
Converting this intuition into a formal test requires quantitative predictions. `No
change' is a testable hypothesis, but `decreasing with the scale of accuracy bonus'
is not. Consequently, testing the hypothesis that wishful thinking is strategic made
it necessary to focus on some particular strategic model. The best known such
model is Optimal Expectations (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005). Agents in this
model have preferences over anticipated consumption, and choose beliefs in order
to maximize their subjective expected utility. The constraint is that, once chosen,
beliefs govern future choices and change only as the result of Bayesian updating.
Agents therefore trade-o the gain from anticipating a high payo, against the cost
in a lower realized bonus: the more favorable they believe the future price to be,
the higher is their anticipatory utility, but the lower the prediction bonus they can
expect to receive. Increasing the scale of the accuracy bonus increases the cost of
biased beliefs and reduces the optimal level of bias. Assuming risk-neutrality over
small stakes, the quantitative prediction is that the magnitude of the bias would be
inversely proportional to the scale of the accuracy bonus (Section 3.2).
Dierent sessions were run with dierent levels of accuracy bonus. The scale of
the bonus was increased ve fold, with the maximum bonus amount varying from
$1 to $5. Results showed no decrease in the magnitude of the bias, consistent with
the prediction of non strategic models. This result is statistically measurable: the
prediction of the Optimal Expectations model was formally rejected (p < 0:0140),
while that of non strategic models was not (p < 0:4026). The experiment, there-
fore, corroborates wishful thinking in its non strategic version. This, of course, is
the version with the most far-reaching implications, implying that wishful thinking
6aects any and all decisions based on subjective judgment, whatever the cost to the
decision maker.
The Brunnermeier and Parker (2005) strategic model and the Mayraz (2011) non
strategic model make comparative statics predictions not only for how the magnitude
of the bias depends on the cost of holding biased beliefs, but also for its dependence
on the amount of subjective uncertainty and on what subjects have at stake in the
quantity that they form expectations over (the sensitivity of the nal payo to the
day 100 price in the context of the present experiment). The prediction of both
models is that the magnitude of the bias increases in both these factors. Testing
these predictions cannot provide a further test of which model is correct, but it can
provide some further assurance that the experiment is sensitive enough for the main
conclusions to be trusted.
In order to make a test of the comparative statics of subjective uncertainty possi-
ble, subjects were asked to provide a condence level together with their prediction.
Condence was provided on a 1-10 scale, calibrated with the help of examples pro-
vided as part of the instructions (Figure 3). By averaging the condence reports
across subjects, it was possible to obtain an estimate of the amount of subjective
uncertainty in dierent charts. This made it possible to test the prediction that the
bias in high subjective uncertainty charts is greater. Results were consistent with
this prediction (Figure 5), and the null hypothesis that the magnitude of the bias is
at least as high in low subjective uncertainty charts was rejected (p < 0:0142). A
robustness test using a dierent measure of uncertainty yielded comparable results.
Due to insucient data, a test of the comparative statics of the stakes was
inconclusive. Two sessions were run with half the stakes, and the estimated bias
was roughly half what it was in the baseline sessions. However, the null hypothesis
that that the bias is the same could not be rejected.6
One concern with interpreting the results of the experiment is that subjects may
have felt the task of predicting the day 100 price is impossible, and that they may
as well choose whichever number they want to be true. Since Farmers gain from
high prices and Bakers gain from low prices, Farmers would choose high guesses,
and Bakers would choose low ones. If this explanation is correct, we would expect
subjects who are generally condent in their predictions to be less biased than less
6The comparative statics of the stakes have been studied before in a dierent but related context.
In a study of self-deception Mijovi c-Prelec and Prelec (2010) found a larger bias when stakes were
higher (the `Anticipation Bonus' treatment) as compared with lower bonus (the `Classication
Bonus' treatment).
7condent subjects. Similarly, we would expect subjects who generally believe prices
in nancial markets are predictable to be less biased than subjects who do not think
prices can be predicted. I tested the rst prediction by dening a subject's condence
level by the average condence rating in her predictions across all charts. I tested the
second prediction by asking subjects in the post experiment questionnaire whether
they believe that prices in nancial markets are generally predictable. In both cases
I obtained just the opposite result: subjects who believe prices are predictable and
relatively condent subjects are more biased than those who are less condent.
These results suggest that this concern is misplaced. Moreover, they support the
view that over-condence is a manifestation of wishful thinking, and that the degree
of wishful thinking bias is a stable individual characteristic.7
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the ex-
periment in detail. Section 3 develops the predictions of the Optimal Expecta-
tions (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005) and Priors and Desires (Mayraz, 2011) mod-
els. Section 4 describes how the data were analyzed. Section 5 presents the results,
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental design
This section describes the experimental design. The implementation and protocol
are in Section 2.1, and the specics of the belief elicitation procedure in Section 2.2.
2.1 Implementation and protocol
The experiment was conducted at the Centre for Experimental Social Science (CESS)
at Nueld College, University of Oxford. The subject pool consisted of Oxford stu-
dents who registered on the CESS website for participation in experiments. Business,
nance, and economics students were excluded. A week before each session students
meeting the sample restrictions received an email inviting them to participate in an
experiment that would require one hour of their time. Further details were given
on-site prior to the experiment itself. Registration was via an online form, allowing
students to select one of several sessions, up to an upper limit of 14 students per
7For example, in Mayraz (2011) each person is characterized by a coecient of relative optimism,
which is a real-number characterizing her degree of optimism or pessimism. The same coecient
is assumed to determine her bias in all domains of subjective judgment.
8session. Taking no-shows into account, sessions consisted of between 10 and 13 stu-
dents. Altogether, 145 students took part in the experiment, of whom 57 were male
and 88 female. The median age was 22.
Sessions were conducted in the afternoon over a total of six days. There were 12
sessions altogether. Half the sessions consisted of Farmers, and half of Bakers. The
order of sessions was randomized in order to prevent any consistent relationship
between the time of day in which a session was held, and the role given to the
subjects who took part in that session.
After subjects were seated, they were each given a copy of the instructions,
which they were able to refer to until the experiment ended. The instructions were
also read aloud, and there was an opportunity for subjects to ask questions. The
experiment itself consisted of 13 periods, the rst of which was a training period,
and the remaining 12 were earning periods. A given set of 13 charts was used
throughout the experiment. One of these 13 charts was reserved for the training
period, and the other 12 charts were used for the earning periods (Figure 2). The
order of presentation was randomized independently between subjects. At the end
of the experiment, each subject had one earning period chosen at random, and was
paid in accordance with the payo in that period.
The experiment was conducted in a computer lab, and was programmed using
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Figure 1 shows an example of the interface. In each
period subjects were shown a chart of wheat prices, and were asked to predict the
price of wheat at some future date. Subjects were thus put in a somewhat similar
position to speculators who ignore fundamental information, and predict future asset
prices on the basis of historical price charts.8 In order to maximize the realism of
the task, prices were adapted from real nancial markets. The specic source was
historical stock prices, scaled and shifted to t into a uniform range. Charts were
selected to include a variety of situations. Time was standardized across charts, so
that all charts had space for prices going from day 0 to day 100. Subjects were only
shown prices up to an earlier date, and the task was to predict what the price of
wheat would be at day 100. The price range was also standardized, so that prices
were always between $4,000 and $16,000.
After submitting their prediction, subjects were presented with a waiting screen
until all other subjects had also made their prediction. There was therefore little
8Traders refer to the use of historical price charts in making buy and sell decisions as Technical
Analysis (Murphy, 1999; Edwards and Magee, 2010).
9or no incentive for speed. The transition to the next period only occurred after
all the subjects in the room had submitted their prediction. A brief questionnaire
was administered following the nal period of the experiment. After all subjects
completed the questionnaire, subjects were informed of their earnings, and were
called to receive their payment.
Farmers were instructed that the price of wheat varies between $4,000 and
$16,000, that it had cost them $4,000 to grow the wheat, and that they would
be selling their wheat for the price that would obtain at day 100. Their notional
prot was therefore between zero and $12,000, depending on the day 100 price.
The payo at the end of the experiment consisted of three parts: an unconditional
$4 participation fee, prot from the sale of the wheat, and a prediction accuracy
bonus. In the baseline sessions subjects received $1 in real money for each $1,000
of notional prot, and could earn up to an extra $1 from making a good prediction.
The prediction procedure and bonus formula are explained in detail in Section 2.2.
Bakers were told that they make bread, which they would sell for a known price
of $16,000, and that in order to make the bread they would be buying wheat at
the price that would obtain at day 100. The range of notion prot was therefore
the same as that of Farmers, and all other particulars were also the same. The one
dierence was that that Farmers gained from high wheat prices, whereas Bakers
gained from low prices.
Sessions diered in the scale of the accuracy bonus and in the stakes (the degree
to which payo depended on the price level at day 100). In the baseline sessions
the maximum obtainable bonus was $1, and the amount received for each $1,000
of notional prot was also $1. Sessions were also conducted with a bonus level of
$2 and $5, and with stakes of 50 pence for each $1,000 of notional prot.9 Table 1
lists the number of sessions in each condition.
2.2 The belief elicitation procedure
The belief elicitation procedure was designed with two goals in mind. The rst
was to make it possible to test for the presence or absence of wishful thinking bias,
namely a systematic dierence in beliefs between Farmers and Bakers. The second
was to obtain a measure of the degree of subjective uncertainty in the predictions
9In sessions with lower stakes, subjects received an additional $3, so that the average payo
was the same as in the baseline sessions.
10Table 1: The number of sessions for each combination of bonus scale and stakes.
bonusa stakesb sessionsc subjects
1 1 4 49 (25 Farmers, 24 Bakers)
2 1 2 26 (13 Farmers, 13 Bakers)
5 1 4 44 (23 Farmers, 21 Bakers)
1 0.5 2 26 (12 Farmers, 14 Bakers)
a The amount in pounds subjects received for an optimal prediction of the day 100 price. The
larger it was, the more subjects had to gain from holding accurate beliefs. The bonus for less
good predictions was scaled accordingly.
b The amount in pounds subjects received for each $1,000 of notional prot. The larger the
stakes, the more subjects had to gain from the the day 100 price being high (if they were
Farmers), or low (if they were Bakers).
c Sessions were conducted in pairs: one for Farmers and the other for Bakers.
subjects make. This was important both for testing whether the magnitude of the
bias is greater in charts with more subjective uncertainty, and for testing whether
more condent individuals are also more biased.
In each period subjects were asked to report two numbers: a prediction and a
condence level. The prediction represented the expected day 100 price, and could
be any number in the range of possible prices. The condence level represented the
(inverse of) the uncertainty in the prediction, and was reported on a 1-10 scale.
In order to give meaning to the 1-10 condence scale, the instructions included
visual examples of distributions with dierent prediction and condence levels (Fig-
ure 3). The distributions were the weighted average of a normal distribution and
a uniform one, with almost all the weight given to the normal. The prediction
corresponded to the mean of the normal distribution, and the condence level was
inversely proportional to its standard deviation. The density corresponding to a
prediction of m 2 [4000;16000] and condence level r 2 [1;10] was
q.x/ D .1   /N.xjm;.r/ 2/ C  (1)
where N.j;2/ represents a normal distribution with a given mean and variance,
 is a scale parameter, translating the 1-10 condence scale into the scale of prices,
and  is the weight given to the uniform component. The eect of the latter was
to ensure that the density was bounded below by , including at prices far from the
prediction.
11The scoring rule was logarithmic: subjects whose prediction and condence level
corresponded to a density q received a bonus given by
b.x/ D  log
 
q.x/=/ (2)
where x is the true day 100 price, and  is a parameter which determines the
maximum bonus level.10 As q   (Equation 1), the bonus was positive for all
possible predictions. The value of  was calibrated for the maximum bonus level in
the session (Table 1).
To see under what conditions the scoring rule is incentive compatible, let P de-
note the probability measure representing the subject's true beliefs, and suppose the
subject reports a prediction m and a condence level r. The subjective expectation


















  DKL.PjjQ/   H.P/   log
 (3)
where DKL.PjjQ/ is the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence or relative en-
tropy) between P and Q, and H.P/ is the entropy of P. Maximizing the ex-
pected bonus with respect to Q is thus equivalent to minimizing the KL-divergence
DKL.PjjQ/. According to a standard result, DKL.PjjQ/  0 for all Q, and is
minimized if Q D P.11
The scoring rule works best if subjects are risk neutral and beliefs are well ap-
proximated by a density in the family described by Equation 1. The scoring rule
should then successfully elicit the prediction and condence level for each subject
in each chart, making it possible to identify the dierence in beliefs between Farm-
ers and Bakers, the average subjective uncertainty in each chart, and the average
condence for each subject.
One potential diculty is hedging.12 Consider a risk-averse Farmer. Her prot
10The logarithmic scoring rule was introduced in Good (1952). See Gneiting and Raftery (2007)
for a recent discussion and comparison to other scoring rules.
11This result, known as Gibb's Inequality, follows directly from the fact that logx is a concave
function (Cover and Thomas, 1991). The instructions explained that the expected bonus is max-
imized by reporting a prediction and condence level that reect the subject's beliefs about the
day 100 price. The bonus formula itself was included in a footnote.
12Blanco et al. (2008) nd evidence of hedging in belief reporting when opportunities are trans-
12is increasing in the price, and she would therefore prefer to receive the bonus in
states in which the price is relatively low. Consequently, she could increase her
subjective expected utility by reporting a lower number than her true beliefs. By a
similar logic, a risk-averse Baker would be better-o by reporting a higher number.
The result would be a downward bias in the estimated dierence in beliefs between
Farmers and Bakers.
A second potential problem is the possibility that the beliefs of some subjects are
bi-modal, or otherwise not well approximated by a density in the family described
by Equation 1. This could make it harder for subjects to see what prediction would
maximize their payo, making predictions within each group more variable than
they would be otherwise. This increase in variance would translate into more noise
in theestimated dierence in beliefs between the two groups, though it should not
result in bias.
3 Theory
This section formally develops the relevant predictions of dierent models of wishful
thinking, including the standard model, Optimal Expectations (Brunnermeier and
Parker, 2005), and Priors and Desires (Mayraz, 2011). By the standard model I mean
the following two assumptions (i) choices maximize subjective expected utility, and
(ii) subjective beliefs are independent of what a person has to gain or lose from an
event being true. Optimal Expectations and Priors and Desires represent wishful
thinking in its strategic and non strategic variants respectively. The ego-utility and
cognitive bias explanations receive no separate treatment, as in in the context of
this experiment they agree with the assumptions of the standard model.
In developing the predictions of these three models I use the following timing
framework: at t D 0 subjects observe a price chart and form their beliefs over the day
100 price; at t D 1 they report their prediction and condence level, and consume
anticipatory utility; at t D 2 the day 100 price is revealed, and payos are realized.
In order to simplify the analysis, I assume that subjects are risk neutral and that
their beliefs about the day 100 price can be represented by a distribution from the
family described by Equation 1. Given these assumptions, the prediction made at
t D 1 coincides with the t D 1 beliefs.
parent and incentives are strong. Armantier and Treich (2010) discuss hedging in probability
elicitation.
133.1 The standard model
Dierent individuals in the standard model may end up with dierent beliefs for
unmodelled (random) reasons. By assumption, however, a person's subjective beliefs
about the day 100 price are not aected by whether she is assigned the role of Farmer
or Baker. Since the role allocation is random, it follows that the t D 0 subjective
beliefs of Farmers and Bakers are drawn from the same distribution. Since the
prediction coincides with the t D 1 beliefs, and as no new information is observed
between t D 0 and t D 1, it follows that predictions are also drawn from the same
distribution. Consequently, there is no systematic dierence in predictions between
Farmers and Bakers.
3.2 Optimal Expectations
Optimal expectations agents choose their prior beliefs in order to maximize their
discounted subjective expected utility, where each period's instantaneous utility in-
cludes anticipatory utility as well as standard consumption utility.
The payo in the experiment is realized at t D 2, and consists of two compo-
nents: the prot and the accuracy bonus. The prot is a function of the true price,
while the bonus depends on the accuracy of the t D 1 beliefs. Anticipatory utility
is proportional to the expected value of the prot and bonus, with expectations
computed using the t D 1 beliefs. The more optimistic those beliefs are, the higher
is anticipatory utility, but the less accurate the prediction is likely to prove. The
t D 0 decision maker choosing her t D 1 beliefs therefore faces a trade-o: more
bias increases the anticipatory utility experienced at t D 1, but lowers the expected
value of the t D 2 consumption utility.
Let P and Q denote the probability distributions representing the t D 0 and
t D 1 beliefs respectively. At t D 0 the agent maximizes a weighted sum of the
t D 1 anticipatory utility and t D 2 realized payo. Let  denote the weight given to
anticipatory utility, so that the weight given to the realized payo is 1   . Letting
x denote the true day 100 price, the prot can be written as x Cl, where x is true
day 100 price,  represents the stakes (the absolute value of the slope relating the
prot to the day 100 price), and  denotes the direction, with  D 1 for Farmers and
 D  1 for Bakers. I denote the bonus by b.x/, where b is dened by Equation 2.
14The t D 0 maximand can thus be written as follows:
W D EQ[x C b.x/] C .1   /EP[x C b.x/] C l (4)
In order to derive the comparative statics of the bias in closed form I make a couple of
simplifying assumptions. First, I assume that P and Q are normal: P D N.0;2
0/,
and Q D N.1;2
1/. Second, I assume that only the mean of Q is subject to bias,
i.e. 1 D 0 D . Given these assumptions and using Equation 3, we can rewrite
Equation 4 as follows:
W D EQ[x C b.x/] C .1   /EP[x C b.x/] C l
D 
 
1   H.Q/   DKL.QjjQ/    log

C .1   /
 
0   DKL.PjjQ/   H.P/    log

C l
D .1   H.Q//   .1   /DKL.PjjQ/ C C
(5)
where C collects factors that are independent of Q. The two terms that depend
on Q represent, respectively, the gain in anticipatory utility from adopting opti-
mistic beliefs, and the cost in expected realized payo of adopting such beliefs. The
gain term has two components. The rst represents the anticipated prot, and is
proportional to 1 D EQ[x]. The second represents the anticipated bonus, and is
decreasing in the degree of uncertainty in Q, measured by its entropy H.Q/. The
gain term is thus larger the more favorable is the expected day 100 price, and the
more certain the subject is about her prediction. The cost term represents the re-
duction in expected bonus due to the bias in the prediction that follows from the
bias in the t D 1 beliefs, and is proportional to the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between the t D 0 beliefs P and the t D 1 beliefs Q. Thus, if the subject cared only
about the realized payo she would choose not to bias her beliefs at all (Q D P). If,
instead, she cared only about her t D 1 instantaneous utility, she would choose to
believe that the most favorable price would be realized,13 and would further choose
to assign this prediction as little subjective uncertainty as possible.
If  is suciently small, the optimal choice of 1 would be an extreme value in
the favorable direction. Otherwise, the optimal value of 1 would be at an inter-
nal point, where @W=@1 D 0. Since we do not observe subjects making extreme
13That is, the highest possible price of $16,000 if a Farmer, and the lowest possible price of
$4,000 if a Baker.
15predictions I assume that  is large enough that the optimal value of 1 is at an in-
ternal point. Using the standard formula for the KL-divergence between two normal
distributions (Johnson and Sinanovic, 2001), and noting that H.Q/ is independent
of 1, the derivative can be written as follows:
@W
@1
D  C 
@H.Q/
@1
  .1   /
@DKL.PjjQ/
@1




Setting the derivative to zero and solving for 1 we obtain the following expression
for the bias:









where  represents the stakes, or the degree to which the prot is dependent on the
value of the day 100 price, 2 represents the degree of subjective uncertainty, and
 represents the scale of the accuracy bonus, or the cost of holding biased beliefs.
Equation 7 describes the bias in the beliefs of one particular individual. The
prediction for the average bias in the population of subjects in the same role is









where I allow for the possibility that  varies between individuals, but assume that
it is independent of 2 (because of the random assignment  is independent of  and
). Finally, it also follows from the random allocation that the undistorted beliefs
of Farmers and Bakers are drawn from the same distribution, and that in particular
E0 is the same in both groups. The expected dierence in beliefs between the two
groups is therefore given by












Optimal Expectations thus implies a systematic dierence in beliefs between Farm-
ers and Bakers that is proportional to the stakes and to the degree of subjective
uncertainty, and inversely proportional to the cost of getting beliefs wrong.
163.3 Priors and Desires
Priors and Desires (Mayraz, 2011) is a non strategic model, that starts by allowing
for the possibility that a person's beliefs may depend on what she wants to be true.
The latter is formalized by a payo-function, which is a mapping from states to
utility values, representing the dependence of the decision maker's utility on the state
of the world. A number of simplifying assumptions are made, and a representation
is derived. The bias in the subjective beliefs of a person with a payo-function f is
represented by the following equation:
q.s/ / p.s/e f .s/ (10)
where s denotes the state, q represents the decision maker's actual (distorted) beliefs,
and p represents her undistorted beliefs, or the beliefs she would hold if she were
indierent between all states.14 Finally,   is a real-valued parameter, called the
coecient of relative-optimism, which describes how optimistic or pessimistic that
particular individual is. A positive value corresponds to optimism, a negative value
to pessimism, and a zero value to realism.
The payo-function in the experiment is the mapping linking the subject's payo
to the day 100 price.15 Using the same notation as in Section 3.2, the payo-
function is given by f .x/ D x C l, where x is the day 100 price,  represents the
stakes, or the slope relating payo to the day 100 price, and  denotes the direction,
with  D 1 for Farmers and  D  1 for Bakers. Suppose, as in Section 3.2,
that undistorted beliefs are given by a normal distribution P D N.0;2/. The
prediction for the actual (distorted) beliefs can be obtained using Equation 10.
Mayraz (2011, proposition 3) analyzes the case of a normal distribution with a
linear payo-function, and shows that the distorted beliefs are normally distributed
with the same variance, and that the mean is shifted in proportion to the coecient
of relative optimism  , the stakes, and the variance. In other words, the distorted
probability measure is given by Q D N.1;2/, where
1   0 D  2 (11)
This equation describes the bias in the beliefs of some particular individual, and is
14That is, if f .s/ D f .s0/ for all s and s0.
15In principle, it should be the payo in utility terms, but I am assuming throughout this section
that subjects are risk neutral over small amounts of money.
17the Priors and Desires analogue of Equation 7. By analogy with Section 3.2, the
expected dierence in beliefs between Farmers and Bakers is
bpriors and desires D 2E[ ]2 / 2 (12)
Comparing this result to Equation 9, we see that|as with Optimal Expectations|
the magnitude of the bias is proportional to the stakes  and the degree of subjective
uncertainty 2. However, whereas in Optimal Expectations the magnitude of the
bias is inversely proportional to the cost of getting beliefs wrong , the magnitude
of the bias in Equation 12 is independent of .
4 Analysis
This section describes how the data was analyzed. The resulting estimates are
presented in Section 5.
4.1 Minimizing hedging bias
As noted in Section 2.2, hedging could lead to a downward bias in estimating the
dierence in beliefs between Farmers and Bakers. In order to minimize this risk, a
questionnaire was administered after the experiment itself was concluded, in which
subjects were asked whether they always reported their best guesses, or whether
they sometimes reported a higher or lower number. Out of a total of 145 students
who took part in the experiment, 132 claimed to have always reported their best
guess, and 13 admitted to an intentional bias in their predictions. Observations
from these 13 subjects were excluded from the main analysis.
4.2 Main regression
The raw data from the experiment consist of the predictions and condence levels
reported by individual subjects in individual charts. The primary goal in analyzing
the data was to determine whether predictions were aected by wishful thinking.
Let yi;j denote the prediction made by subject i in chart j, and let ti 2 f1; 1g
denote whether subject i is a Farmer or a Baker. We want to know whether yij is
systematically higher if ti D 1. In order to answer this question formally I used the
18following regression model:
yij D 0:5ti C
X
j
jdj C ij (13)
where dj is a dummy for chart j, and ij is the error term. The value of  represents
the contribution of wishful thinking. The null hypothesis is that   0.
4.3 Comparative statics
The second goal in analyzing the data was to investigate the comparative statics
of the bias. This required estimating the bias separately in dierent subsamples of
interest. Let K denote a partition of the sample, indexed by k, and let cijk denote
a dummy for whether the prediction of subject i in chart j belongs to subsample k.
Assuming wishful thinking is the only systematic source of dierence in predictions







jdj C ij (14)
In this equation k represents the average dierence in predictions between Farm-
ers and Bakers in class k, and can be used to dene formal comparative statics
hypotheses.
4.4 Standard errors
Unobserved factors may result in a correlation in the predictions made by the same
subject in dierent charts, so that ij may be correlated with ik for j 6D k. In
order to allow for this possibility, standard errors are clustered by subject in all
regressions.
5 Results
This section presents the results of the experiment, starting with the overall dier-
ence in predictions between Farmers and Bakers, and continuing with the compara-
tive statics of the bias. Parameter estimates and statistical test results are presented
19in summary form in Table 3. Figures 4 and 5 provide a graphical illustration of the
results.
5.1 Wishful thinking bias
The overall magnitude of the wishful thinking bias corresponds to the systematic
dierence in predictions between Farmers and Bakers across the entire sample,
represented by the value of  in Equation 13. The estimate for this number is
$452, measured with a robust standard error of $123. The null-hypothesis that it
is non-positive is rejected with a p-value of 0:0002.
This estimate excludes observations from the 13 subjects who admitted in the
post experiment questionnaire to biased reporting of their beliefs (Section 4). If
these subjects are nonetheless included, the estimate goes down to $390. This
dierence is consistent with the prediction that risk-averse Farmers (Bakers) would
intentionally understate (overstate) their estimates of the day 100 price.
The observed dierence in predictions between Farmers and Bakers can be ex-
plained by wishful thinking, but not by ego-utility or by a cognitive bias.
5.2 Incentives for accuracy
Strategic models of wishful thinking predict that the magnitude of the bias would
be decreasing in the incentives for accuracy, while non strategic models predict that
it would remain the same. In order to determine whether higher incentives for
accuracy result in lower bias, Equation 14 was used to estimate the dierence in
beliefs between Farmers and Bakers separately in sessions with dierent levels of
accuracy bonus (Table 1).
The results in Table 3 are that the estimated bias is actually greater in sessions
with a higher bonus level, the point estimates being 298, 560, and 645, respectively.
On the face of it, these results are consistent with neither type of model. Formal
testing, however, reveals that the apparent increase in the magnitude of the bias may
well be random (p < 0:4026). The data is, therefore, consistent with the prediction
of non strategic models that the magnitude of the bias would be invariant to changes
in the incentives for holding accurate beliefs.
The same is not true, however, for strategic models. The prediction of the
Optimal Expectations model is that the magnitude of the bias would be inversely
proportional to the scale of the accuracy bonus (Section 3.2). That is, the bias in
20$2 bonus sessions should be half the size of the bias in $1 bonus sessions, and the
bias in $5 bonus sessions should be one fth the size. This prediction is rejected by
the data (p < 0:0140).16
The rst panel of Figure 5 shows these results graphically. Though the point
estimates are increasing in the maximum level of the accuracy bonus, a horizontal
parallel line can be comfortably tted within the condence intervals. The same is
not true, however, for a hyperbolic curve.
5.3 Subjective uncertainty
According to both Optimal Expectations (Section 3.2) and Priors and Desires (Sec-
tion 3.3), the magnitude of the bias should be increasing in the degree of subjective
uncertainty. In order to test this prediction, I divided the 12 charts used in the pay-
ing periods into two equal sized groups by the degree of subjective uncertainty in
the chart, and used Equation 14 to estimate the bias separately in the two subsam-
ples.17 I used two dierent measures of subjective uncertainty. The rst was based
on the condence ratings that subjects provided: charts were classied into the high
(low) subjective uncertainty group if the mean (across all subjects) of the condence
rating for the chart was below (above) median. The second measure of uncertainty
was the within group variance of predictions: charts were classied into the high
(low) subjective uncertainty group if the within group variance of predictions for
that chart was above (below) median. In practice, the two measures resulted in
nearly identical classications.
Depending on the measure used, the estimated bias was 635 or 677 in the group of
high subjective uncertainty charts, and 269 or 227 in the low subjective uncertainty
group. The null hypothesis|that the magnitude of the bias in high subjective
uncertainty charts would be less than or equal to the magnitude of the bias in low
subjective uncertainty charts|was rejected with a p-value of 0.0142 when using the
rst classication method, and a p-value of 0.0034 when using the second (Table 3).
These results support the qualitative prediction that the magnitude of the bias
is increasing in the degree of subjective uncertainty. Given that the qualitative
prediction of the two models ts the data, it is interesting to try and test the
specic functional form predicted by the two models. The quantitative prediction
16This is the a joint hypothesis test. The hypothesis that the magnitude of the bias in $5 sessions
is one fth that of $1 sessions is rejected with a p-value of 0:0069.
17Each subsample consists of observations from all subjects, but in only half the charts.
21is that the magnitude of the bias is linear in the variance of subjective uncertainty.






jdj C ij (15)
In this equation the 0:5ti term in Equation 13 is replaced by 0:502
j ti, where 2
j
is the variance of subjective uncertainty in chart j.
Testing this quantitative prediction requires a good proxy for the variance of
subjective uncertainty. Using the above measures of subjective uncertainty, we can
identify 2
j either with the square of the inverse mean condence rating in chart
j, or with the mean within group prediction variance for chart j.18 Table 2 shows
the resulting regression t when estimating the two equations using both proxies for
the variance of subjective uncertainty, as well the results of tting a model which
includes both the 0:5ti term of Equation 13 and the 0:502
j ti of Equation 15. The
results show that Equation 15 indeed provides a better t to the data, consistent
with the prediction that the magnitude of the bias is linear in the degree of subjective
uncertainty.
The same results can also be seen graphically in the second and third panels of
Figure 5. Panel 2 plots the estimated wishful thinking bias in the 12 charts against
the mean prediction condence in the chart, and panel 3 plots the same data against
the within group prediction variance. In both panels a curve is tted to the data
using Equation 15.
5.4 Stakes
Optimal Expectations and Priors and Desires also predict that the magnitude of the
bias is increasing in the stake subjects have in what the day 100 price would be.
Payo depends on the day 100 price via the notional prot, which is linear in the
day 100 price with a slope of 1. The amount of money received for each $1,000 of
notional prot was $1 in 10 sessions and 50p in the remaining 2 sessions (Table 1).
I estimated the magnitude of the bias separately in these two subsamples (Equa-
tion 14). The magnitude of the bias was 260 in the low stakes subsample, and 495
in the standard stakes subsample. These results are consistent with the prediction
that the magnitude of the bias is linear in the stakes (p < 0:9668). The modest
18This assumes a representative agent approximation.
22Table 2: Testing whether the magnitude of the bias increases with the variance
of subjective uncertainty. Column 1 ts a model in which the bias is independent
of subjective uncertainty (Equation 13). Column 2 and 4 t a model in which the
magnitude of the bias is linear in the variance (Equation 15). Columns 3 and 5
t a model which allows for both regressors. Method 1 and method 2 refer to the
two proxies for subjective uncertainty (Section 5.3). The ti2
j variable is normalized
to have the same standard deviation as ti, so that the regression coecients are
comparable in size. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The regression R2
is computed after netting out the contribution of the chart dummies. Statistical
signicance indicators: *** p < 0:01, ** p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
method 1 method 2
ti 452  473  458
(122) (259) (272)
ti2
j 497 955 503 945
(129) (309) (130) (319)
R2 0.0181 0.0218 0.0230 0.0224 0.0237
variance in the stakes between sessions was, unfortunately, insucient to produce
statistically measurable results, and the hypothesis that the bias is not any smaller
in the low stakes subsample could not be rejected (p < 0:2313). See also Table 3
and panel 4 of Figure 5.
5.5 Over-condence
Section 5.1 demonstrates the existence of a systematic dierence in predictions be-
tween Farmers and Bakers. This dierence in predictions is interpreted as evidence
of wishful thinking bias aecting subjects' judgment about the day 100 price. A
key assumption is that subjects believe they have better than random odds of mak-
ing a good prediction, so it is in their interest to report their true beliefs. If this
assumption is not true, subjects could very well choose whichever prediction they
enjoy making, without having to worry about losing the prediction bonus. As long
as subjects prefer reporting a price that would benet them, we could observe a
systematic dierence in predictions between Farmers and Bakers that has nothing
to do with wishful thinking.
If this alternative explanation is correct, we would expect subjects who lack
23condence in their predictions to be more biased than condent subjects, since such
subjects have less to lose from biasing their prediction. Similarly, we would expect
subjects who generally believe prices in nancial markets are unpredictable to be
more biased than subjects who believe prices can be predicted.
In order to test the rst prediction I dened a proxy for a subject's condence by
the average prediction condence for that subject across all charts. I then split the
sample into more and less condent subjects, and estimated the bias separately in the
two subsamples. In order to test the second prediction I included a question in the
post experiment questionnaire about the predictability of prices in nancial markets,
and divided subjects into two groups by whether they thought prices can generally
be predicted. The bias was then estimated separately in the two subsamples.19
The result was just the opposite: subjects who believe prices are predictable
and relatively condent subjects are more biased than those who are less condent.
Specically, the estimated bias among relatively condent subject is 628, compared
with 276 among less condent subjects. The hypothesis that more condent subjects
are less biased is rejected with p-value of 0.0732. Similarly, the estimated bias among
subjects who believe prices in nancial markets to be generally predictable was 613,
as compared with 292 among subjects who believed prices cannot be predicted. The
hypothesis that subjects who believe prices to be predictable are less biased was
rejected with a p-value of 0.0997.
By and large, therefore, subjects believe they have at least some ability to predict
the day 100 price, and the stronger this belief is, the more biased they are. This
result is consistent with the wishful thinking interpretation, and further suggests
that over-condence is a manifestation of wishful thinking, and that the degree of
wishful thinking bias is a stable individual characteristic.20
19The question was \We are interested in what people believe about nancial markets. How
predictable are the movements of prices in nancial markets in your opinion?" The possible choices
were: \Prices can be predicted to a signicant extent", \Prices can rarely be predicted", and \The
idea that prices can be predicted is an illusion". The rst choice was dened as yes, and the other
two as no. The distribution of answers was 66, 58, and 8, respectively.
20This explains why individuals with more than average wishful thinking bias also tend to be
over-condent. The tendency to be more or less biased can be identied with the coecient of
relative optimism in Mayraz (2011).
245.6 Gender
Though the psychology evidence is mixed (Lundeberg et al., 2000), certain behav-
ioral dierences between men and women, such as a propensity to overtrade among
men, have been interpreted as evidence of gender dierences in condence (Barber
and Odean, 2001). Subjects in the experiment included 62 percent females and 38
percent males, and there was therefore sucient variation to test for gender dier-
ences in wishful thinking. The estimated bias is 411 for males and 477 for females,
and the hypothesis of no dierence cannot be rejected (p < 0:7956).
6 Conclusion
This paper describes an experimental test of wishful thinking bias in predictions
of asset prices. Subjects received an accuracy bonus for their predictions of the
future price of an asset, and an unconditional payment that was either increasing
or decreasing in this price. Both groups of subjects had the same information,
and faced the same incentives for accuracy. Nevertheless, and despite incentives for
hedging, subjects in the group beneting from high prices predicted systematically
higher prices than subjects in the group beneting from low prices. These results are
consistent with wishful thinking, and cannot be accounted for by such alternative
explanations as ego-utility or cognitive bias.
By varying the scale of the accuracy bonus it was possible to test whether the
magnitude of the bias decreases with the incentives to hold accurate beliefs. No
such decrease was found, and the prediction of Optimal Expectations (Brunnermeier
and Parker, 2005) that the magnitude of the bias is inversely proportional to the
incentives for accuracy, was formally rejected. This result is hard to square with
strategic models of wishful thinking, but is consistent with non strategic models,
such as Mayraz (2011). The implication is that wishful thinking can signicantly
aect beliefs even if the costs are high.
Other comparative statics results include good evidence that wishful thinking
bias is stronger when subjective uncertainty is high, evidence that over-condence
and wishful thinking bias go together, and some evidence of greater bias when payo
is more strongly dependent on the state of the world.
Taken together, these results suggest that any and all subjective beliefs are af-
fected by wishful thinking bias, and that the bias may well be suciently strong to
25materially aect economically important decisions. High stakes decisions in nan-
cial markets are a case in point, as they involve probability assessments in situations
characterized by high stakes and high subjective uncertainty|both of which are
conducive to the presence of an economically signicant bias.
In interpreting this conclusion, it is important to bear in mind that decision
makers in high stakes situations have an incentive to invest in quality information
in order to reduce the uncertainty in their beliefs. Since the strength of the bias
depends on the degree of subjective uncertainty, quality information will not only
reduce the variance in beliefs, but would also (perhaps unintentionally) reduce the
magnitude of the bias. The degree to which wishful thinking is likely to aect
high stakes decisions is therefore dependent on decision makers' ability to reduce
uncertainty before making their choices.
One way to asses the degree of uncertainty is to examine the beliefs of informed
experts. In many important decision making environments (nancial markets, cor-
porate decision making, politics, war) informed experts commonly disagree. The
failure of experts to come to anything approaching consensus suggests the existence
of a substantial level of irreducible uncertainty. When that is the case, there is
evidently signicant potential for wishful thinking to materially aect decisions.
The present paper describes one particular experiment on one particular group
of subjects. While the main conclusions are strongly statistically signicant, it
would clearly be important to see whether the results can be replicated by other
researchers and in other decision making environments. Another important limi-
tation in interpreting the results of the experiment is the limited range of theories
under consideration. While I am not aware of any other non ad hoc theory that
can explain the results of the experiment, it is important to emphasize that if such
a theory were to be oered, it may signicantly change the interpretation of the
experiment's results.
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29Figure 1: The interface of the Farmers treatment with a maximum accuracy bonus
of $5. The interface of the Bakers treatment was similar, except: (a) the rst three
lines were: \You have a buyer for $16,000 worth of bread from your bakery. At day
100 you will get the money from the order, and will have to use some of it to buy
wheat at the market. Your prot is whatever you would have left after paying for
the wheat.", and (b) instead of an arrow on the chart pointing to $4,000 with the
label \Wheat production costs", there was an arrow pointing to $16,000 with the
label\The price you would get for your bread".
30Figure 2: The charts used in the 12 earning periods. The x-axis represents time,
ranging from day 0 to day 100, and the y-axis represents price, ranging from $4,000
to $16,000. The data for the charts were adapted from historical equity price data,
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Figure 3: The examples of distributions used in the instructions. Each distribution
is characterized by a prediction and a condence level. These examples were used
in explaining the prediction elicitation procedure. They were particularly useful in
establishing a reference for the 1-10 scale that was used in reporting the subject's
condence in her prediction.
32Table 3: Wishful thinking bias and comparative statics. The table reports the
estimated bias in dierent sub-samples and statistical tests of related hypotheses.
Sample Estimated biasa Observationsb
All subjects 452 (s.e. 123) 1584 (132)
negative ? p < 0:0002
Cost of bias
Accuracy bonus: low ($1) 298 (s.e. 164) 816 (68)
Accuracy bonus: medium ($2) 569 (s.e. 328) 300 (25)
Accuracy bonus: high ($5) 645 (s.e. 210) 468 (39)
low D medium D high ? p < 0:4026




Chart uncertainty: low 269 (s.e. 127) 792 (66)
Chart uncertainty: high 635 (s.e. 166) 792 (66)
low > high ? p < 0:0142
Within chart variance: low 227 (s.e. 113) 792 (66)
Within chart variance: high 677 (s.e. 175) 792 (66)




Stakes: low (50p) 260 (s.e. 289) 288 (24)
Stakes: standard ($1) 495 (s.e. 135) 1296 (108)
standard  2  low ? p < 0:2313d




Average condence: low 276 (s.e. 174) 792 (66)
Average condence: high 628 (s.e. 169) 792 (66)
low > high ? p < 0:0732
Prices predictable? no 292 (s.e. 174) 792 (66)
Prices predictable? yes 613 (s.e. 174) 792 (66)
no > yes ? p < 0:0997
Demographics
Males 411 (s.e. 187) 600 (50)
Females 477 (s.e. 166) 984 (82)
same ? p < 0:7956
a Robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical signicance indicators: *** p < 0:01, **
p < 0:05, * p < 0:1.
b An individual observation refers to the prediction of a given subject in a given chart.
Clustering is by subjects. The number of clusters is in parentheses.
c If the regression is restricted to the sessions with standard stakes the test p-values are 0.5094
and 0.0171 respectively.
d If the regression is restricted to the sessions with a low maximum bonus the test p-values are





Figure 4: Histogram of the mean predictions made by Farmers and Bakers. A
normal distribution curve was tted to both histograms. The mean prediction was
10102 and 9650 respectively. 16 of the 20 subjects making the highest (lowest) mean
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Figure 5: The comparative statics of wishful thinking bias. The panels show a 95
percent condence interval for dierence in predictions between Farmers and Bakers
(the treatment eect) in dierent subsamples. The rst panel shows the comparative
statics of the cost of holding wrong beliefs, represented by the maximum accuracy
bonus. The solid hyperbolic line represents the best t for the Optimal Expectations
model, and the dashed horizontal line that of Priors and Desires. The second panel
shows the bias in a chart against the mean condence in predictions for that chart.
The curve is tted to the inverse of the square of the mean condence level. The
third panel shows the bias in a chart against the mean within group predictions
variance. The dashed line is a linear t through the origin. Finally, the fourth panel
shows the comparative statics of the stakes, the x-axis representing the amount in
pounds that a subject receives for each $1,000 of notional prot. The dashed line
is a linear t through the origin.
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